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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
────────────────────────────────────
RICARDO VIGIL, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,

15-cv-8211 (JGK)

- against -

OPINION AND ORDER

TAKE-TWO INTERACTIVE SOFTWARE, INC.,
Defendant.
────────────────────────────────────
JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:
The advent of new technologies in the field of biometrics
--- the field of science relating to the identification of
humans based upon unique biological traits, such as
fingerprints, DNA, and retinas --- has produced new ways of
conducting commercial transactions. In 2008, to promote,
regulate, and safeguard the use of biometrics in financial
transactions, Illinois enacted the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/1 et seq. (the
“BIPA”), which sets forth disclosure, consent, and retention
requirements for private entities that collect, store, and
disseminate biometric data.
The defendant, Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc. (“TakeTwo”), is one such private entity that collects biometric data
for use in its video games, “NBA 2K15” and “NBA 2K16.” The
plaintiffs, Vanessa Vigil and Ricardo Vigil, have brought this
putative class action pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act,
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28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). More specifically, Ricardo Vigil bought and
played NBA 2K15, and his sister Vanessa Vigil played his copy of
that video game. The plaintiffs used a feature in the video game
to scan their respective faces to create personalized virtual
basketball players, exclusively for in-game play. Although the
plaintiffs do not contend that their face scans have been
disseminated, or used for any purpose, other than for playing
the video game, for which they gave consent, the plaintiffs
contend that Take-Two failed to comply with various provisions
of the BIPA.
On January 15, 2016, Take-Two moved pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1), and Rule 12(b)(6), of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims. Subsequently, the
Supreme Court issued Spokeo, Inc. v. Robin, 136 S. Ct. 1540
(2016), which clarified that for an injury-in-fact to be
“concrete,” it must be “real, and not abstract,” and that a
“bare procedural violation” under a federal statute, “divorced
from any concrete harm,” that “may result in no harm,” would not
“satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.” Id. at 1549 (internal
quotation marks omitted). By Order dated July 1, 2016, this
Court ruled that the plaintiffs should be allowed to replead in
light of Spokeo, and denied without prejudice to renewal TakeTwo’s pending motion to dismiss. See Dkt. 42. The plaintiffs
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filed their Second Amended Complaint, and Take-Two renewed its
motion.
The parties subsequently submitted supplemental letters
concerning the impact of Strubel v. Comenity Bank, No. 15-528CV, 2016 WL 6892197 (2d Cir. Nov. 23, 2016), which interpreted
Spokeo.
For the following reasons, Take-Two’s motion to dismiss the
Second Amended Complaint is granted.1
I.
When presented with a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, and a motion to dismiss on other grounds, the
first issue is whether the Court has the subject matter
jurisdiction necessary to consider the merits of the action. See
Rhulen Agency, Inc. v. Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 896 F.2d 674,
678 (2d Cir. 1990).
In defending against a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff bears the burden
of proving the Court’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
1

Take-Two has moved in the alternative to strike the Second
Amended Complaint’s class allegations. Because the Second
Amended Complaint is dismissed for want of standing, and for
failure to establish a cause of action under the BIPA, it is
unnecessary to reach the alternative basis for relief. TakeTwo’s motion to strike the Second Amended Complaint’s class
allegations is therefore denied as moot.
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evidence. Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.
2000). In considering such a motion, the Court generally must
accept the material factual allegations in the complaint as
true. See J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d 107,
110 (2d Cir. 2004). The Court does not, however, draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Id.; see also
Graubart v. Jazz Images-, Inc., No. 02-CV-4645 (KMK), 2006 WL
1140724, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2006). Indeed, where
jurisdictional facts are disputed, the Court has the power and
the obligation to consider matters outside the pleadings, such
as affidavits, documents, and testimony, to determine whether
jurisdiction exists. See Anglo–Iberia Underwriting Mgmt. Co. v.
P.T. Jamsostek, 600 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2010); APWU v.
Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 627 (2d Cir. 2003); Kamen v. Am. Tel. &
Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir. 1986). In so doing, the
Court is guided by the body of decisional law that has developed
under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Kamen,
791 F.2d at 1011; see also Aguilar v. Immigration & Customs
Enf’t Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 811 F. Supp. 2d
803, 821-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
the allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, and all
reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff’s favor.
McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir.
4
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2007). The Court’s function on a motion to dismiss is “not to
weigh the evidence that might be presented at a trial but merely
to determine whether the complaint itself is legally
sufficient.” Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir.
1985). The Court should not dismiss the complaint if the
plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). While the Court should construe the factual allegations
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a
court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in
the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id.
When presented with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), the Court may consider documents that are referenced
in the complaint, documents that the plaintiff relied on in
bringing suit and that are either in the plaintiff’s possession
or that the plaintiff knew of when bringing suit, or matters of
which judicial notice may be taken. See Chambers v. Time Warner,
Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002).

5
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II.
Illinois enacted the BIPA in 2008. The legislative findings
accompanying the BIPA explain that the BIPA was passed, in part,
because the Illinois legislature anticipated that commercial
businesses would increasingly use biometric data, such as
fingerprints, to facilitate financial transactions. 740 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 14/5(a-b). As the Illinois legislature observed,
biometric data are by definition unique, and thus --- unlike a
credit card number --- cannot realistically be changed if they
are subject to identity theft. See 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/5(c).
The Illinois legislature was concerned that the failure of
businesses to implement reasonable safeguards for such data
would deter Illinois citizens from “partaking in biometric
identifier-facilitated transactions” in the first place, and
would thus discourage the proliferation of such transactions as
a form of engaging in commerce. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/5(e).
The BIPA represents the Illinois legislature’s judgment that the
collection and storage of biometrics to facilitate financial
transactions is not in-of-itself undesirable or impermissible;
instead, the purpose of the BIPA is to ensure that, when an
individual engages in a biometric-facilitated transaction, the
private entity protects the individual’s biometric data, and
does not use that data for an improper purpose, especially a
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purpose not contemplated by the underlying transaction. See 740
Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/5(a-g).
Under the BIPA, a “biometric identifier” is “a retina or
iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face
geometry,” while “biometric information” is information based on
“biometric identifiers.” 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/10. Among other
things, the BIPA includes a number of provisions to regulate the
collection, dissemination, and storage of biometric identifiers
and biometric information. First, Section 15(a) provides that:
A
private
entity
in
possession
of
biometric
identifiers or biometric information must develop a
written
policy,
made
available
to
the
public,
establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for
permanently
destroying
biometric
identifiers
and
biometric information when the initial purpose for
collecting
or
obtaining
such
identifiers
or
information has been satisfied or within 3 years of
the individual’s last interaction with the private
entity, whichever occurs first.
See 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/15(a). Second, the BIPA
requires private entities to “store, transmit, and protect from
disclosure all biometric identifiers and biometric information
using the reasonable standard of care within the private
entity’s industry,” and to treat such identifiers and
information as sensitive and confidential. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat.
14/15(e).
Third, Section 15(b) provides that a private entity that
collects biometric identifiers or biometric information must (1)
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inform the subject in writing that a biometric identifier, or
biometric information, is being collected; (2) inform the
subject in writing of the purpose and length of the collection
and storage; and (3) receive a written release from the subject.
740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/15(b). Fourth, Section 15(c) prohibits
private entities from selling biometric identifiers and
biometric information to third-parties. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat.
14/15(c). Finally, and relatedly, Section 15(d) prohibits
private entities from disseminating biometric identifiers and
biometric information without prior written consent, or unless
such dissemination is necessary to complete a financial
transaction authorized by the subject. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat.
14/15(d).
The BIPA provides that “any person aggrieved by a
violation” of the BIPA may pursue money damages and injunctive
relief against the offending party.2 See 740 Ill. Comp. Stat.
14/20. The BIPA also provides for attorney’s fees to be awarded
to the prevailing party. See id.

2

Specifically, the BIPA provides that the prevailing party may
recover the greater of $1,000 in liquidated damages, or actual
damages, for each negligent violation of the BIPA, and the
greater of $5,000 in liquidated damages, or actual damages, for
each reckless or intentional violation of the BIPA. See 740 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 14/20.
8
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III.
A.
Take-Two is a Delaware corporation, with its headquarters
and principal place of business located in New York, New York,
that publishes, develops, and distributes video games. SAC ¶¶ 1,
9. Among numerous other video games, Take-Two publishes,
develops, and distributes the popular video games “NBA 2K15” and
“NBA 2K16” (collectively, the “NBA 2K Games”) that are playable
on personal computers and other gaming platforms. SAC ¶ 1. The
NBA 2K Games are basketball simulation video games that allow a
gamer to play as, and against, virtual basketball players, many
of whom are designed based upon real professional players from
the National Basketball Association. SAC ¶ 27. A gamer can play
the NBA 2K Games in multiplayer mode with other gamers over the
Internet. See, e.g., SAC ¶ 36.
The NBA 2K Games include the “MyPlayer” feature, which
allows a gamer to create a “personalized basketball avatar”
based upon a three-dimensional rendition of the gamer’s face.
SAC ¶¶ 27, 29. To create the avatar, the NBA 2K Games use
cameras connected to the gaming platform to scan the gamer’s
face and head. SAC ¶ 29. The scanning is a lengthy and involved
process that takes about 15 minutes, during which time the gamer
must stare up-close at the camera while also turning his or her
head from side-to-side at regular intervals. SAC ¶ 29.
9
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The plaintiffs allege that Take-Two’s proprietary
technology extracts geometric data from the scan related to the
unique points and contours of the gamer’s face, and converts
that data into a personally identifying animated rendition of
the gamer’s face. SAC ¶¶ 29-31. The rendition then becomes the
face of the gamer’s personalized basketball avatar for in-game
play. SAC ¶ 29. The MyPlayer feature’s only alleged purpose is
to create personalized basketball avatars. See SAC ¶ 27.
If a gamer wishes to use the MyPlayer feature, the gamer
must first agree to the following terms and conditions:
Your face scan will be visible to you and others you
play with and may be recorded or screen captured
during gameplay. By proceeding you agree and consent
to such uses and other uses pursuant to the End User
License Agreement.
www.take2games.com/eula
See SAC ¶ 28.3 Third-party gamers can view the rendition if
the gamer choses to play with the personalized basketball avatar
in multiplayer mode. See SAC ¶ 35. There is no requirement that
a gamer who uses the MyPlayer feature be an actual purchaser or
owner of an NBA 2K Game. See SAC ¶ 40.
The plaintiffs allege that Take-Two indefinitely stores the
biometric information it collects through the face scans on its
servers. SAC ¶ 28. They also allege that Take-Two transmits
unencrypted biometric information through the “open commercial
3

The hyperlink in the terms and conditions links to Take-Two’s
“Limited Software Warranty and License Agreement.”
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Internet.” SAC ¶ 35. The plaintiffs further allege that Take-Two
markets and advertises the MyPlayer feature. SAC ¶ 36.
B.
The plaintiffs, Ricardo Vigil and Vanessa Vigil, are
siblings, and are alleged to be residents and citizens of
Illinois. SAC ¶¶ 7-8, 39-40. The Second Amended Complaint
alleges that Ricardo Vigil is the purchaser and owner of a copy
of NBA 2K15, and that Vanessa Vigil played her brother’s copy of
the game. SAC ¶¶ 39-40.
The plaintiffs allege that they each used the MyPlayer
feature to scan their faces to create their own personalized
basketball avatars. SAC ¶ 41. Prior to the scanning, the
plaintiffs allege that they each agreed to the MyPlayer terms
and conditions described above. SAC ¶ 41. The plaintiffs allege
that they subsequently chose to enter a multiplayer game with
their personalized basketball avatars, meaning that the digital
renditions of their faces, which the plaintiffs claim constitute
biometric information under the BIPA, were visible to thirdparties also playing NBA 2K15. SAC ¶ 45. The Second Amended
Complaint contains no allegations regarding the quality of the
plaintiffs’ personalized basketball avatars, such as the degree
to which the digitized faces of the plaintiffs’ avatars
resembled the plaintiffs.

11
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Even though the plaintiffs agreed to the MyPlayer terms and
conditions, the plaintiffs allege that they failed to appreciate
the gravity associated with using MyPlayer --- especially that
renditions of their face scans would be allegedly indefinitely
stored on Take-Two’s servers, transmitted over the commercial
Internet, and subject to allegedly inadequate protections --because they did not receive adequate written disclosures from
Take-Two. See SAC ¶¶ 42-52. The plaintiffs allege that they have
both “become weary” of participating in biometric-facilitated
transactions, and have since refrained from participating in
such transactions due to their experience with NBA 2K15. SAC ¶
61.
The Second Amended Complaint alleges that Ricardo Vigil’s
purchase of NBA 2K15 was motivated in material part by his
desire to use the MyPlayer feature, but that he did not at the
time of the purchase understand Take-Two’s alleged practices
with respect to biometric information. SAC ¶¶ 53-55. The Second
Amended Complaint alleges that, “After purchasing and opening
the packaging on the NBA 2K15 video game, Plaintiff Ricardo
Vigil had no option to return the video game for a monetary
refund,” and that he has therefore suffered tangible, monetary
harm. SAC ¶ 55.
There is no allegation that the plaintiffs did not realize
that their own faces were unique identifiers prior to using the
12
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MyPlayer feature. There is no allegation that the plaintiffs did
not understand that the only purpose of the MyPlayer feature was
to create a personalized basketball avatar for in-game play,
including in multiplayer mode. And there is no allegation that
the plaintiffs’ face scans have been disseminated in any form
other than to the gamers who played in multiplayer games with
the plaintiffs.4
The plaintiffs claim that Take-Two has violated the BIPA in
almost every respect. First, the plaintiffs claim that Take-Two
did not publicly provide a retention schedule or guidelines for
permanently destroying biometric identifiers in violation of
Section 15(a). SAC ¶¶ 38, 75. Second, they claim that Take-Two
failed to inform the plaintiffs properly in writing that their
biometric identifiers would be collected, and failed to explain
the purpose and length of that collection, in violation of
Section 15(b). SAC ¶¶ 32-33, 73. Third, the plaintiffs claim
that Take-Two collected biometric information without first
obtaining a written release from the plaintiffs, also in
violation of Section 15(b). SAC ¶¶ 34, 74. Fourth, the
plaintiffs claim that Take-Two disclosed and disseminated their
biometric identifiers without obtaining adequate consent in
4

Counsel for the plaintiffs made clear at oral argument that the
plaintiffs are not seeking to base their claims on their
volitional entrance into multiplayer games, where the digital
renditions of their faces on the personalized basketball avatars
could be viewed by third-parties.
13
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violation of Section 15(d). SAC ¶¶ 35, 76. Fifth, the plaintiffs
claim that Take-Two failed to transmit their biometric
identifiers with industry-standard reasonable care in violation
of Section 15(e). SAC ¶¶ 35, 37, 77. Finally, the plaintiffs
claim that Take-Two has profited from the plaintiffs’ biometric
identifiers in violation of Section 15(c). SAC ¶¶ 36, 57, 78.
The plaintiffs seek money damages, injunctive relief, and
reasonable attorney’s fees. SAC ¶¶ 79-80.
IV.
The plaintiffs have compiled a long list of purported
technical violations of the BIPA. In an effort to create
standing to pursue their claims for these technical violations,
the plaintiffs try several different alleged theories of harm,
variously arguing that they have suffered from the procedural
violations themselves (including from “informational injuries”
and the enhanced risk of harm that their face scans will be
subject to a data breach); apprehension about engaging in future
biometric-facilitated transactions; misappropriation; intrusion
on seclusion; and a diminished benefit-of-the-bargain associated
with purchasing NBA 2K15.
Take-Two has moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint
for two reasons. First, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Take-Two argues that the plaintiffs do
not have Article III standing to pursue their claims under the
14
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Constitution. Second, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Take-Two argues that the plaintiffs do
not have a cause of action under the BIPA.5
A.
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the
jurisdiction of federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.”
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992). To
satisfy the requirements of Article III standing, a plaintiff
must show that (1) the plaintiff has suffered an actual or
imminent injury in fact, which is concrete and particularized;
(2) there is a causal connection between the injury and
defendant’s actions; and (3) it is likely that a favorable
decision in the case will redress the injury. Id. at 560–61.
“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of
establishing these elements.” Id. at 561; see also Springer v.

5

Take-Two semantically framed its second argument for dismissal
as being based on “statutory standing” grounds, but the “Supreme
Court has recently clarified . . . that what has been called
‘statutory standing’ in fact is not a standing issue, but simply
a question of whether the particular plaintiff ‘has a cause of
action under the statute.’” Am. Psychiatric Ass’n v. Anthem
Health Plans, Inc., 821 F.3d 352, 359 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 1377, 1387 (2014)). The Court of Appeals has advised that
courts should “avoid [the statutory standing] appellation going
forward.” Id.; see also Leyse v. Bank of Am. Nat. Ass’n, 804
F.3d 316, 320 (3d Cir. 2015) (“A dismissal for lack of statutory
standing is effectively the same as a dismissal for failure to
state a claim, and a motion to dismiss on this ground is brought
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), rather than Rule 12(b)(1).” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
15
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U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 15-CV-1107(JGK), 2015 WL 9462083, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2015). In a class action, a court must
analyze the injuries allegedly suffered by the named plaintiffs,
not unnamed members of the potential class, to determine whether
the plaintiffs have Article III standing. Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 502 (1975).
A legally protected interest may exist solely by virtue of
“statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing.” Id. at 500. However, the injury-in-fact requirement
“is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be
removed by statute.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S.
488, 497 (2009).
“An allegation of future injury may suffice if the
threatened injury is ‘certainly impending,’ or there is a
‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.” Susan B. Anthony
List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (quoting Clapper
v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5 (2013)). The
Supreme Court in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robin, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016),
recently clarified that “[f]or an injury to be ‘particularized,’
it ‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual
way,’” id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.l), while
for an injury to be “concrete,” it must be “real, and not
abstract,” id. at 1548 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court instructed that the determination of whether a violation
16
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of a statute constitutes a concrete injury-in-fact is aided by
reference to congressional intent and the common law. Id.
However, Spokeo held that although “Congress may ‘elevat[e] to
the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto
injuries that were previously inadequate in law,’” id. at 1549
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578), a “bare procedural violation”
under a federal statute, “divorced from any concrete harm,” that
“may result in no harm,” would not “satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement.” Id.
In the context of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the
“FCRA”) --- which requires consumer reporting agencies to
“‘follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy of’ consumer reports,” and “to notify providers and
users of consumer information of their responsibilities under
the [FCRA],” and gives an injured individual a private right of
action for an agency’s willful failure to comply with the FCRA,
see id. at 1545 (citations omitted) --- the Supreme Court in
Spokeo observed that an agency that merely disseminated a
deficient statutory notice, or inaccurate information that was
not materially inaccurate, absent more, would have only

17
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committed “bare procedural violations” of the FCRA that would
not give rise to a concrete injury, see id. at 1550.6
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Strubel v.
Comenity Bank, No. 15-528-CV, 2016 WL 6892197 (2d Cir. Nov. 23,
2016), interpreted “Spokeo, and the cases cited therein, to
instruct that an alleged procedural violation can by itself
manifest concrete injury where Congress conferred the procedural
right to protect a plaintiff’s concrete interests and where the
procedural violation presents a ‘risk of real harm’ to that
concrete interest. But even where Congress has accorded
procedural rights to protect a concrete interest, a plaintiff
may fail to demonstrate concrete injury where violation of the
procedure at issue presents no material risk of harm to that
underlying interest.” Id. at *5 (citation omitted). In Strubel,
a consumer claimed that a bank’s allegedly deficient disclosures
violated the Truth in Lending Act (the “TILA”), and entitled the
consumer to seek statutory damages under the TILA. See id. at
*1-2. The Court of Appeals began its assessment of the
consumer’s standing by analyzing the concrete interests
protected by the TILA. See id. at *4 (“[T]o determine whether a
procedural violation manifests injury in fact, a court properly
considers whether Congress conferred the procedural right in
6

The Article III principles articulated in Spokeo also apply to
laws enacted by the States. See Hecht v. Hertz Corp., No. 2:16CV-01485 (WJM), 2016 WL 6139911, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2016).
18
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order to protect an individual’s concrete interests.”). The
court observed that the goals of the TILA’s disclosure
requirements are to “protect consumers against inaccurate and
unfair credit billing and credit card practices and promote the
informed use of credit by assuring a meaningful disclosure of
credit terms.” Id. at *2 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). In other words, these were the concrete interests that
the TILA’s mandatory disclosure requirements were designed to
protect. See id.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the consumer had
standing to pursue only some of her claims of TILA violations.
The court found that the consumer had standing to pursue claims
related to notice violations that could actually hinder the
exercise of her prospective rights as a consumer, without any
allegations of additional harm, because those violations could
frustrate a “core object of the TILA” of “avoiding the
uninformed use of credit.” Id. at *5 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). As the court observed, “A consumer who
is not given notice of his obligations is likely not to satisfy
them and, thereby, unwittingly to lose the very credit rights
that the law affords him.” Id.
By contrast, the Court of Appeals found that a claim based
upon the failure to present clearly certain information in the
notice about the bank’s prospective obligations to the consumer
19
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--- but that could not plausibly obscure prospective rights that
the consumer could exercise --- would be too abstract to support
standing because no actual harm resulted, and, even if a risk of
harm had materialized, the bank could have still complied with
its obligations under the TILA despite the deficient notice
about its obligations. See id. at *8 (“It would be more than
curious to conclude that a consumer sustains real injury to
concrete TILA interests simply from a creditor’s failure to
advise of a reporting obligation that, in the end, the creditor
honors.”). There was no real material risk that the goals of the
TILA would be frustrated by these statutory violations. See id.
at *7-8. While not dispositive, the Court of Appeals also noted
that the consumer had not alleged that she (or, more generally,
any consumer) would have changed her behavior to avoid any
adverse consequences from the deficient notice, which further
weighed against a finding of standing. Id. at *7. In addition,
the Court of Appeals found that the bank’s failure to notify the
consumer about a credit product that the bank did not offer
could not support standing. Id. at *6.
Also instructive is a recent decision of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in
McCollough v. Smarte Carte, Inc., No. 16 CV 03777, 2016 WL
4077108 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2016), which denied standing to a
plaintiff for alleged violations of the BIPA. In that case, the
20
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defendant provided for rent a fingerprint-coded locker that used
the plaintiff’s fingerprint as the “key” to lock and unlock the
locker. See id. at *1. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant
had violated multiple provisions of the BIPA. See id.
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant collected
and indefinitely retained fingerprint data without publishing
any destruction guidelines. See id. at *1-2. The plaintiff also
alleged that the defendant failed to give any notice, or receive
any written consent acknowledging, that the defendant was
collecting or using biometric identifiers. Id. at *1. The court
dismissed the plaintiff’s claims of bare procedural and
technical violations of the BIPA for want of Article III
standing, reasoning that the plaintiff “undoubtedly understood
when she first used the system that her fingerprint data would
have to be retained until she retrieved her belongings from the
locker.” Id. at *3. As the court held, “Even without prior
written consent to retain, if [the defendant] did indeed retain
the fingerprint data beyond the rental period, this Court finds
it difficult to imagine, without more, how this retention could
work a concrete harm.” Id. at *4 (citing Gubala v. Time Warner
Cable, Inc., No. 15-CV-1078-PP, 2016 WL 3390415, at *4 (E.D.
Wis. June 17, 2016), aff’d, No. 16-2613, 2017 WL 243343 (7th
Cir. Jan. 20, 2017)); see also Gubala v. Time Warner Cable,
Inc., No. 16-2613, 2017 WL 243343, at *1-4 (7th Cir. Jan. 20,
21
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2017) (dismissing for lack of Article III standing claims for
alleged violations of the Cable Communications Policy Act (the
“CCPA”), a data protection statute analogous to the BIPA);
Braitberg v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 836 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir.
2016).7
(i)
The plaintiffs argue that the purported procedural
violations of the BIPA, without any allegations of additional
harm, are sufficient to confer standing. The plaintiffs’
allegations of procedural violations fall into two
interconnected categories: violation of the provisions
regulating the storage and dissemination of biometric
information, see 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/15(a), (b), (c), (e),
and violation of the provisions governing notice and consent,
see 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/15(a), (b), (d).
Under Strubel, to assess the plaintiffs’ standing to pursue
their claims, the first task is to identify any “concrete
interests” protected by the BIPA. The plaintiffs contend that an
individual’s right to privacy in the individual’s biometrics is

7

As explained below, the court in McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108,
at *4, also held that the plaintiff did not have a cause of
action under the BIPA because the plaintiff was a not a “person
aggrieved by a violation” of the statute within the meaning of
the BIPA. The conclusion that the alleged procedural violations
here cannot support Article III standing is bolstered by the
conclusion that the plaintiffs do not have a cause of action
under the BIPA.
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the concrete interest protected by the BIPA. Cf. In re Facebook
Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., No. 15-CV-03747-JD, 2016 WL
2593853, at *10 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2016) (reasoning that, for
conflict of laws purposes, the “BIPA manifests Illinois’
substantial policy of protecting its citizens’ right to privacy
in their personal biometric data”).8 Put more finely, “[t]he core
object,” Strubel, 2016 WL 6892197, at *5, of the BIPA is data
protection to curb potential misuse of biometric information
collected by private entities. The provisions of the BIPA
plainly seek to ensure that, when an individual engages in a
biometric-facilitated transaction, the private entity protects
the individual’s biometric data, and does not use that data in a
way not contemplated by the underlying transaction. The BIPA
expressly contemplates the use of biometric information for the
transactions contemplated by the parties. See also 740 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 14/10(d)(2) (permitting “disclosure or redisclosure”
of biometrics that “completes the financial transaction”).
None of the plaintiffs’ allegations of procedural
violations, on their own, demonstrate a material risk of harm to
the BIPA’s concrete data protection interest because there is no
plausible allegation that there is a material risk that the
plaintiffs’ biometrics may be used in a way not contemplated by
8

In re Facebook, 2016 WL 2593853, at *11, did not consider any
standing issues, and thus is of limited relevance to the
standing question here.
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the underlying use of the MyPlayer feature. The plaintiffs
allege that they agreed to the MyPlayer terms and conditions,
that NBA 2K15 scanned their faces to create personalized
basketball avatars, and that the plaintiffs used their
personalized basketball avatars for in-game play. The plaintiffs
thus allege that the MyPlayer feature functioned exactly as
anticipated. There is no allegation that Take-Two has
disseminated or sold the plaintiffs’ biometric data to thirdparties, or that Take-Two has used the plaintiffs’ biometric
information in any way not contemplated by the only possible use
of the MyPlayer feature: the creation of personalized basketball
avatars for in-game play. See Boelter v. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc.,
No. 15-cv-3934, 2016 WL 3369541, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2016)
(holding that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue claims for
alleged violations of the Michigan Video Rental Privacy Act
where the defendant-company, without permission, sold personal
data to third-parties, including data mining companies). The
purported violations of the BIPA are, at best, marginal, and the
plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their claims for the alleged
bare procedural violations of the BIPA.
(a)
With respect to the purported violations of the BIPA’s
storage and dissemination provisions, the plaintiffs fail to
establish that there is an imminent risk of harm that Take-Two’s
24
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storage and dissemination of their facial scans could compromise
the data protection interest of the BIPA. The plaintiffs
primarily predicate their standing argument on Take-Two’s
alleged failure to store and transmit their facial scans with a
reasonable degree of industry-standard care, and in a manner
used for other types of confidential and sensitive information,
in violation of Section 15(e) of the BIPA.
In Strubel, the Court of Appeals cited the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Braitberg, 836 F.3d
at 929–30, which held “that [the] unlawful retention of personal
information did not manifest concrete injury absent alleged
disclosure or misuse,” Strubel, 2016 WL 6892197, at *8 n.15, and
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2016 WL 4728027, at *3 (6th
Cir. Sept. 12, 2016) (summary order), which held that the
“failure to adopt statutorily mandated procedures to protect
against wrongful dissemination of data manifested concrete
injury where plaintiffs alleged data was stolen.” Strubel, 2016
WL 6892197, at *8 n.15. This case is plainly more analogous to
Braitberg than Galaria. The plaintiffs’ allegations do not
establish an imminent risk that their biometrics could actually
be misused, and there has been no event, such as the data theft
in Galaria, that could make any such risk rise above the
abstract level. See also Gubala, 2017 WL 243343, at *1 (“[The
25
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plaintiff] has presented neither allegation nor evidence of
having been ‘aggrieved’ by [the defendant’s] violation of [the
CCPA]—no allegation or evidence that in the decade since he
subscribed to [the defendant’s] residential services any of the
personal information that he supplied to the company when he
subscribed had leaked and caused financial or other injury to
him or had even been at risk of being leaked.”).
At best, the plaintiffs’ allegations are that Take-Two’s
storage and dissemination practices have subjected their facial
scans to an “enhanced risk of harm” of somehow falling into the
“wrong hands,” which is too abstract and speculative to support
standing. See McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *4; see also,
e.g., Nat’l Council of La Raza v. Gonzales, 468 F. Supp. 2d 429,
444 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[S]peculation that . . . some unauthorized
party may access plaintiffs’ [information stored in a database]
in violation of a plaintiff members’ privacy right does not
satisfy the requirement that plaintiffs identify an ‘actual or
imminent,’ ‘concrete and particularized’ injury.”); Gubala, 2017
WL 243343, at *1-2, *4; Braitberg, 836 F.3d at 930; Chambliss v.
Carefirst, Inc, No. CV RDB-15-2288, 2016 WL 3055299, at *2 (D.
Md. May 27, 2016) (dismissing claims for failure to protect
personal data in compliance with the Maryland Personal
Information Protection Act for want of standing); see also
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150 (expressing “our usual reluctance to
26
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endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about the
decisions of independent actors”). Indeed, the plaintiffs do not
allege that their face scans have been obtained by a thirdparty, subjected to identity theft, or misused in any way.
The plaintiffs attempt to circumvent the speculative and
abstract nature of their claims by arguing that the potential
risk of harm associated with the face scans could be potentially
great because faces are relatively immutable, and, unlike (for
example) passwords, cannot be changed. But the hypothetical
magnitude of a highly speculative and abstract injury that is
not certainly impending does not make the injury any less
speculative and abstract. See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147-1148;
Summers, 555 U.S. at 497 (“[T]he injury-in-fact requirement is a
hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by
statute.”).
The plaintiffs also argue that Take-Two violated Section
15(c) of the BIPA by somehow “profiting” from the plaintiffs’
facial scans when the plaintiffs played NBA 2K15 with their
personalized basketball avatars in multiplayer mode. The
plaintiffs’ theory appears to be that Take-Two advertises the
MyPlayer feature, which encourages individuals to purchase NBA
2K15 games.9 The allegations are insufficient for standing

9

The plaintiffs’ claim here appears to be based on a misreading
of the BIPA. Section 15(c) of the BIPA provides that, “No
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because they do not establish that the plaintiffs suffered any
actual or imminent harm as a result of Take-Two’s advertising
practices. The plaintiffs allege that Take-Two has advertised
the MyPlayer feature; they do not allege that Take-Two has used
their facial scans to promote or advertise NBA 2K15, or that
Take-Two has otherwise profited from their facial scans by, for
example, selling the scans to third-parties.
(b)
With respect to the purported violations of the notice and
consent provisions, the plaintiffs claim that the notice and
consent that they received was insufficient because the MyPlayer
feature terms and conditions did not specifically disclose that
private entity in possession of a biometric identifier or
biometric information may sell, lease, trade, or otherwise
profit from a person’s or a customer’s biometric identifier or
biometric information.” 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/15(c) (emphasis
added). The plaintiffs appear to interpret “profiting” to mean
that a private entity violates the BIPA by selling a game that
includes a biometric-related feature. That interpretation is
plainly at odds with the BIPA, which is designed to regulate and
promote, but not inhibit, biometric-facilitated transactions.
Instead, Section 15(c) is clearly geared toward prohibiting the
unauthorized dissemination of biometric information that a
private entity is already “in possession of” due to an
underlying biometric-facilitated transaction, but where the
dissemination is not otherwise contemplated by the underlying
biometric-facilitated transaction. In relation to the other
terms in Section 15(c) --- “selling,” “leasing,” and “trading”
--- “otherwise profiting” is a catchall for prohibiting
commercially transferring biometric information and biometric
identifiers in a manner not contemplated by the original
biometric-facilitated transaction, without consent from the
individual pursuant to Section 15(d). Promoting a transaction
--- here, the sale of a video game --- by advertising a
biometric-related feature does not contravene the statute.
28
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their faces constituted biometrics, the purpose of the scanning,
or the length of the face scan retention period; because the
plaintiffs’ consent to use the MyPlayer feature was not embodied
in a writing; and because Take-Two did not publish a biometric
retention schedule. These violations can only support standing
if they pose a material risk of harm to the data protection goal
of the BIPA. At best, more extensive notice and consent could
have dissuaded the plaintiffs from using the MyPlayer feature,
meaning that Take-Two would have never collected the plaintiffs’
biometrics. But the plaintiffs have failed to establish that
their use of the MyPlayer feature resulted in any imminent risk
that the data protection goal of the BIPA would be frustrated.
Consequently, more extensive notice and consent could not have
altered the standing equation because there has been no material
risk of harm to a concrete BIPA interest that more extensive
notice and consent would have avoided.
The plaintiffs argue that the alleged notice and consent
violations harmed their “right-to-information” about the
underlying biometric transaction, which the plaintiffs contend
should be sufficient in-of-itself to confer standing without any
allegations of additional harm. The purported right-toinformation about a biometric-facilitated transaction is not a
concrete interest separate from the core object of the BIPA to
prevent biometric data misuse. The alleged failure to give the
29
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plaintiffs more extensive notice and consent is not a material
risk to a concrete BIPA interest where no material risk of
biometric data misuse ever materialized. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct.
at 1549; McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *3-4.
Contrary to the plaintiffs’ arguments, the BIPA is not akin
to a statute where the right-to-information is a concrete
interest in-of-itself, such as a statute designed to give a
consumer information about prospective statutory rights that the
consumer could exercise, but that might otherwise be lost, see
Strubel, 2016 WL 6892197, at *5-6 (discussing the TILA); a
statute designed to provide information about government
activities, see FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998) (the
Federal Election Campaign Act); Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of
Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1989) (the Federal Advisory
Committee Act); or a statute designed to remedy housing
discrimination by ensuring that all individuals, including
protected classes, receive truthful information about housing
availabilities, see Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S.
363, 374 (1982) (the Fair Housing Act).
Unlike statutes where the provision of information about
statutory rights, or matters of public concern, is an end
itself, the BIPA’s notice and consent provisions do not create a
separate interest in the right-to-information, but instead
operate in support of the data protection goal of the statute.
30
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Section 15(a) requires that private entities publish retention
and destruction schedules for biometric data. However, a private
entity may destroy biometrics pursuant to the requirements set
forth in Section 15(a), and thus effectively comply with the
core data protection goal of the BIPA while also technically
violating the BIPA by failing to publish a retention schedule.
See Strubel, 2016 WL 6892197, at *8 (“It would be more than
curious to conclude that a consumer sustains real injury to
concrete TILA interests simply from a creditor’s failure to
advise of a reporting obligation that, in the end, the creditor
honors.”).
The BIPA’s mandated disclosures are minimal. Section 15(b)
of the BIPA simply provides that a notice must “inform[] the
subject . . . in writing that a biometric identifier or
biometric information is being collected or stored,” that the
notice must include the length and purpose of that collection,
and that consent must be in writing. The BIPA’s disclosure and
consent requirements are plainly designed to allow parties to
set the contours for the permissible uses of the biometrics
collected in the underlying biometric-facilitated transaction to
ensure that the data collected is used only for the fulfillment
of the transaction in question. Once biometric data is collected
by a private entity, there is no further prospective BIPA right
that the individual can exercise --- and thus that the
31
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individual could be advised about at the outset --- other than
to expand the scope of the underlying transaction pursuant to
Section 15(d). See Strubel, 2016 WL 6892197, at *8 (finding that
disclosures that did not hinder the exercise of prospective
rights that the consumer could exercise weighed against a
finding of standing). Even without fully compliant notice and
consent, no concrete BIPA interest can be harmed so long as the
private entity only uses the biometrics collected as both
parties intended. See McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *3.
In arguing that bare violations of the notice and consent
provisions alone can support standing, the plaintiffs are
essentially attempting to bootstrap two sets of bare procedural
violations --- the alleged procedurally deficient notice and
consent that failed to warn the plaintiffs about the later
procedural violations of the BIPA with respect to storage and
dissemination --- without establishing a material risk to a
concrete interest protected by the BIPA. But “in the absence of
a connection between a procedural violation and a concrete
interest, a bare violation of the former does not manifest
injury in fact.” Strubel, 2016 WL 6892197, at *4. The only
concrete interest protected by the BIPA is biometric data
protection. Because the plaintiffs have failed to establish a
material risk to that interest, the plaintiffs’ claims of
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violations of the notice and consent provisions of the BIPA must
be dismissed for want of standing.
Moreover, the difference between the actual notice and
consent in this case, and that purportedly required by the BIPA,
does not rise to more than a procedural violation, which is
plainly insufficient for standing under Spokeo and Strubel.
There is no plausible allegation that, based on the notice the
plaintiffs received, the plaintiffs did not understand that
their faces would be scanned, and that those face scans would be
used to create personalized basketball avatars. The plaintiffs
allege that they received advance notice that their faces would
be scanned, that they consented to have their faces scanned when
they agreed to the MyPlayer terms and conditions, and that TakeTwo used the face scans to create personalized basketball
avatars. Ricardo Vigil allegedly bought NBA 2K15 so that the
plaintiffs could use the MyPlayer feature for its only alleged
purpose, the creation of personalized basketball avatars. The
plaintiffs further allege that they appreciated that the
digitized renditions of their faces would appear onscreen in
multiplayer mode over the Internet. The allegations establish
that the plaintiffs understood the purpose of using the MyPlayer
feature, and there is no allegation that Take-Two has strayed
from that purpose.
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Although the MyPlayer terms and conditions explicitly
referenced “face scans,” SAC ¶ 28, the plaintiffs claim that
they did not understand that their “face scans” were unique
“biometric identifiers” as defined by the BIPA. To the extent
that informing a “subject” in a notice about a “face scan” (a
type of biometric identifier), as opposed to using the specific
words “biometric identifier” (a statutory term of art), is in
fact a violation of the BIPA, the alleged violation is merely a
procedural violation, and poses no real risk of harm to a BIPA
interest. The allegations show that the plaintiffs, at the very
least, understood that Take-Two had to collect data based upon
their faces in order to create the personalized basketball
avatars, and that a derivative of the data would be stored in
the resulting digital faces of those avatars so long as those
avatars existed. See McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *1 n.1, *3
(finding that it would be inconceivable that a plaintiff would
not understand that a locker that used a fingerprint to lockand-unlock the locker would not collect and store fingerprint
data).
The gravamen of the plaintiffs’ right-to-information theory
is thus necessarily that, even though the plaintiffs understood
the purpose of the face scans, the plaintiffs did not adequately
understand that Take-Two had a duty under the BIPA to destroy
their biometric data within a prescribed time period. Although
34

Case 1:15-cv-08211-JGK Document 74 Filed 01/30/17 Page 35 of 51

Take-Two failed to disclose the length of the retention, the
allegedly indefinite retention does not on its own pose an
imminent risk of harm to any concrete BIPA interest. See Gubala,
2017 WL 243343, at *1-2; Braitberg, 836 F.3d at 929–30;
McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *3-4. Moreover, Take-Two may
ultimately destroy the biometric data in compliance with Section
15(a) of the BIPA. Thus, the technical violations of the BIPA
may result in no harm to the plaintiffs despite the notice
deficiency, which cannot support standing. See Strubel, 2016 WL
6892197, at *8 (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550).
In addition, the plaintiffs do not claim that they would
have foregone use of the MyPlayer feature if they had received
more extensive notice and consent. The Second Amended Complaint
only alleges that, had Ricardo Vigil known that Take-Two was not
complying with the BIPA, he would not have purchased NBA 2K15.
But even that allegation of buyer’s remorse is not plausible
given the allegation that both plaintiffs used the MyPlayer
feature, and that any failure to comply with the BIPA presented
no risk of an imminent or concrete injury to either of the
plaintiffs. See Strubel, 2016 WL 6892197, at *7-8.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claims for procedural
violations of the notice and consent provisions of the BIPA are
not in-of-themselves sufficient to confer standing.
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(ii)
The plaintiffs advance several theories of additional harm
in an effort to manufacture an injury-in-fact, but these
theories are divorced from any alleged violations of the BIPA.
None of the theories is sufficient for standing purposes.
First, the plaintiffs claim that, as a result of their
experiences with NBA 2K15, they have become reluctant to enter
into future biometric-facilitated transactions. The plaintiffs
have suffered no injury-in-fact as a result of Take-Two’s
alleged violations of the BIPA, and “cannot manufacture standing
merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of
hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.”
Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1151; see also Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672
F.3d 64, 79 (1st Cir. 2012) (“When an individual alleges that
her injury is having to take or forebear from some action, that
choice must be premised on a reasonably impending threat.”). The
plaintiffs’ alleged apprehension that a hypothetical private
entity may, in an unrelated biometric-facilitated transaction,
violate the BIPA, is too speculative and abstract to support
standing.
Second, the plaintiffs argue that Take-Two has
misappropriated their facial scans to their detriment, and
thereby invaded their privacy. They further contend that the
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BIPA represents an extension of Illinois common law privacy
protections to biometrics.
Under Illinois law, to state an “appropriation claim,” a
plaintiff must allege “an appropriation, without consent, of
one’s name or likeness for another’s use or benefit. . . . This
branch of the privacy doctrine is designed to protect a person
from having his name or image used for commercial purposes
without consent.” Dwyer v. Am. Exp. Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1355
(Ill. App. 1995) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The
plaintiffs’ creative theory of misappropriation is incompatible
with the claims in the Second Amended Complaint because the
plaintiffs allege that they agreed to have their faces scanned,
and displayed on personalized basketball avatars.
Moreover, while the plaintiffs argue that the plaintiffs’
facial scans must have value to Take-Two, any value to Take-Two
is irrelevant so long as Take-Two takes no action that
diminishes the value of the plaintiffs’ likenesses. See id.
(“Undeniably, each cardholder’s name is valuable to defendants.
. . . [But] defendants’ practices do not deprive any of the
cardholders of any value their individual names may possess.”).
There is no allegation that Take-Two has taken any action that
would diminish the value of the plaintiffs’ likenesses, and thus
no allegations that could support an injury-in-fact for
misappropriation. See, e.g., Gubala, 2017 WL 243343, at *3
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(noting that “[v]iolations of rights of privacy are actionable,
but . . . there is no indication of any violation of the
plaintiff’s privacy because there is no indication that [the
defendant] has released, or allowed anyone to disseminate, any
of the plaintiff’s personal information in the [the defendant’s]
possession” and characterizing the claim that the mere unlawful
retention of personal information diminished the value of that
information as “gibberish”); Braitberg, 836 F.3d at 930
(“Although there is a common law tradition of lawsuits for
invasion of privacy, the retention of information lawfully
obtained, without further disclosure, traditionally has not
provided the basis for a lawsuit in American courts.”). The
plaintiffs’ theory of misappropriation is inapplicable to this
case.
Third, in their most recent submission, the plaintiffs
contend that the real gravamen of their complaint is that,
although they consented to have their faces scanned, they did
not explicitly consent to have their biometric identifiers
scanned and retained. The plaintiffs claim that this is a
violation of their right to “biometric privacy.” The plaintiffs
argue that, because they gave consent in response to a
procedurally deficient notice, their consent was ineffective.
The plaintiffs’ theory of a violation of a right to
biometric privacy is simply the latest variant on two already
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rejected theories of harm: misappropriation and injury to a
purported BIPA “right-to-information” interest. There is no
basis for this claimed injury. See Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc.,
No. 2:15-0190 (WJM), 2016 WL 6133827, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 20,
2016) (noting that while a statute “as a whole may implicate
traditional privacy interests, Plaintiff’s alleged injury” that
the defendants were disclosing information in violation of the
statute was insufficient to establish standing).
Again, Illinois common law is instructive. Illinois has
adopted the Second Restatement of Tort’s definition of intrusion
on seclusion, meaning, “One who intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”
Lawlor v. N. Am. Corp. of Ill., 983 N.E.2d 414, 424 (Ill. 2012)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977)). “The core
of this tort is the offensive prying into the private domain of
another. . . . The examples provided [by Prosser and Keeton’s
treatise on torts] as forming the basis for the tort of
intrusion into the seclusion of another include the following
acts: invading someone’s home; an illegal search of someone’s
shopping bag in a store; eavesdropping by wiretapping; peering
into the windows of a private home; and persistent and unwanted
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telephone calls.” Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat. Bank of
Princeton, 534 N.E.2d 987, 989 (Ill. 1989) (citation omitted).
Intrusion on seclusion is therefore analogous to tortious or
criminal trespass. See id.; Benitez v. KFC Nat. Mgmt. Co., 714
N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (Ill. App. 1999). The sine qua non of an
intrusion is that it is unauthorized. See Schmidt v. Ameritech
Ill., 768 N.E.2d 303, 312 (Ill. App. 2002). Nevertheless, at
common law, not every unlawful or unauthorized collection of
information, or collection of information for an improper
purpose, gave rise to an intrusion on seclusion. See, e.g.,
Dwyer, 652 N.E.2d at 1351, 1354 (affirming dismissal of
intrusion on seclusion claim against a credit-card company that
compiled and sold customer data to third-parties because the
customers had voluntarily given such information to the company,
even though the company gave no notice to its customers
regarding the complained-of activities, which allegedly violated
consumer protection laws).
The plaintiffs argue that the BIPA created a substantive
right to privacy in biometric identifiers, but there is nothing
in the statute to support the assertion. The BIPA created
procedural safeguards so that consumers could enter into
transactions using biometric identifiers without having those
identifiers misused. The plaintiffs do not allege that their
biometric identifiers have been used for anything other than for
40
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in-game play in NBA 2K15, a use for which the plaintiffs
expressly consented. The plaintiffs’ allegations are thus not
akin to a violation of the common law tort of intrusion on
seclusion, which involves an unauthorized intrusion.
Regardless of whether the plaintiffs understood the insand-outs of the face scanning technology, or knew that their
faces were “biometric identifiers” under the BIPA, the
plaintiffs plainly understood that the MyPlayer feature had to
collect data based upon their unique faces to create the
personalized basketball avatars. See McCollough, 2016 WL
4077108, at *3. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ argument, a merely
procedurally deficient notice does not automatically invalidate
any resulting consent, and thus give rise to an Article III
injury based on an invasion of privacy. See id.; Nokchan v.
Lyft, Inc., No. 15-CV-03008-JCS, 2016 WL 5815287, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 5, 2016) (rejecting the claim “that the authorization
[the plaintiff] gave [the defendant] to obtain his personal
information was not proper” under the FCRA could support an
injury for invasion of privacy); see also Gubala, 2017 WL
243343, at *3 (“[The defendant] did not take the plaintiff’s
personal information away from him; he still has it . . .; he
hasn’t been deprived of anything; and he isn’t asking [the
defendant] to return his personal information in its files to
him; he is asking it to comply with the [CCPA] by destroying the
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information, an act that if committed is unlikely to have the
least effect on him.”); Braitberg, 836 F.3d at 930.
This case is nothing like the cases upon which the
plaintiffs rely, such as Matera v. Google Inc., No. 15-CV-04062LHK, 2016 WL 5339806 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2016). In that case,
the court found that the plaintiffs had standing where the
defendant had allegedly “intercept[ed], scan[ed], and analyz[ed]
. . . email[s] . . . without the plaintiffs’ knowledge or
consent” in violation of wire-tap and other privacy statutes.
Id. at *1, *10-14. The plaintiffs’ artful resort to a theory of
intrusion on seclusion, or privacy, cannot save their claims.10
Finally, the plaintiffs argue that Ricardo Vigil suffered a
tangible economic harm because he purchased NBA 2K15, in part,
due to the presence of the MyPlayer feature, and has since
wanted to return the game for a refund in light of Take-Two’s
alleged failure to comply with the BIPA. The implication is
that, had Ricardo Vigil known that Take-Two would allegedly
violate the BIPA, he would never have purchased the game. The
plaintiffs’ argument rests on a diminished “benefit-of-thebargain” theory of liability --- that Take-Two’s alleged

10

The parties dispute whether the plaintiffs had a privacy
interest in their faces that could be invaded in the first
place, but it is unnecessary to reach the issue because the
plaintiffs’ allegations cannot be construed to have established
a claim based on any theory of invasion of privacy.
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procedural violations diminished the value of the transaction
for Ricardo Vigil.
The plaintiffs’ argument is an odd fit with their claims
that Take-Two violated the statutory provisions of the BIPA, and
essentially crams a breach of contract, or unjust enrichment,
theory of liability into a complaint that includes no breach of
contract or unjust enrichment claims. See Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst
Labs., 283 F.3d 315, 320-21 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that “[t]he
plaintiffs apparently believe that if they keep oscillating
between tort and contract law claims, they can obscure the fact
that they have asserted no concrete injury” and rejecting as
“artful pleading” the plaintiffs’ “attempt to recast their
product liability claim in the language of contract law”).
The plaintiffs’ theory of harm is attenuated from any
alleged procedural violations of the BIPA, which have caused
Ricardo Vigil no concrete harm in the first place. In data
storage and collection cases, courts have consistently rejected
as too tenuous to support an injury-in-fact claims that a
defendant’s failure to comply with the law, or to prevent an
actual data breach, diminished the “benefit-of-the-bargain.”
See, e.g., Braitberg, 836 F.3d at 931 (“Nor are we convinced
that [the plaintiff] has alleged an economic injury arising from
an alleged diminution of the value of the cable services that he
purchased from [the defendant]. . . . [W]ithout a plausible
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allegation that [the defendant’s] mere retention of the
information caused any concrete and particularized harm to the
value of that information, [the plaintiff] has not adequately
alleged that there was any effect on the value of the services
that he purchased from [the defendant].”); Chambliss, 2016 WL
3055299, at *5-6; In re Zappos.com, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949,
962 n.5 (D. Nev. 2015); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp.
(SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 14, 30
(D.D.C. 2014); Duqum v. Scottrade, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-1537-SPM,
2016 WL 3683001, at *6 (E.D. Mo. July 12, 2016). Ricardo Vigil
received the benefit of the bargain with Take-Two, a copy of NBA
2K15 with a MyPlayer feature. The Second Amended Complaint fails
to allege any way in which Take-Two’s alleged procedural
violations of the BIPA --- which otherwise caused Ricardo Vigil
no Article III injury --- diminished the value of that bargain.
Furthermore, compliance with the laws is ordinarily not
presumed to be part of a contractual bargain absent an express
or implied agreement. See, e.g., Banco del Austro, S.A. v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 16-CV-00628 (LAK), 2016 WL 6084082, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2016); Stewart v. Gino’s E. Rest. Corp., No.
07C6340, 2008 WL 4865882, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2008). The
Second Amended Complaint has not alleged that Take-Two promised
Ricardo Vigil that it would comply with the BIPA when he
purchased NBA 2K15, let alone that Ricardo Vigil purchased NBA
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2K15 with that expectation. As such, the Second Amended
Complaint has not plausibly alleged that compliance with the
BIPA was part of the bargain between Take-Two and Ricardo Vigil,
meaning that any noncompliance with the BIPA by Take-Two could
not have plausibly diminished the value of the bargain for
Ricardo Vigil.
The plaintiffs cannot aggregate multiple bare procedural
violations to create standing where no injury-in-fact otherwise
exists. Accordingly, the plaintiffs do not have Article III
standing to pursue their claims against Take-Two.
B.
Independent of Article III standing, Take-Two argues that
the plaintiffs do not have a cause of action under the BIPA. The
BIPA grants a private right of action to “any person aggrieved
by a violation” of the BIPA. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/20. TakeTwo interprets “aggrieved” as limiting the private of action to
parties that have been injured by a statutory violation. TakeTwo therefore contends that, for the reasons discussed above,
the plaintiffs have failed to allege an injury that could
support a cause of action under the BIPA.
As with the Article III standing inquiry, the McCollough
decision is instructive, and supports Take-Two’s interpretation
of the BIPA. The court in McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *4,
concluded that the term “aggrieved” in the BIPA requires a
45

Case 1:15-cv-08211-JGK Document 74 Filed 01/30/17 Page 46 of 51

plaintiff to establish an injury due to a statutory violation,
and held that the plaintiff there, in addition to lacking
Article III standing, also did not have a cause of action under
the BIPA. To arrive at that conclusion, the court analyzed the
use of “aggrieved” within the broader Illinois statutory
landscape:
The [BIPA] does not define “aggrieved.” Other Illinois
statutes, however, do define “aggrieved party.” Under
the Illinois Human Rights Act, for example, it means
“a person who is alleged or proved to have been
injured by a civil rights violation or believes he or
she will be injured by a civil rights violation . . .
.” 775 ILCS 5/1-103(B). Under the Soil and Water
Conservation District Acts an aggrieved party “means
any person whose property resources, interest or
responsibility is being injured or impeded in value or
utility or any other manner by the adverse effects of
sediment caused by soil erosion . . . .” 70 ILCS
405/3.20. These definitions each invoke the concept of
injury resulting from a statutory violation. Thus, it
appears that by limiting the right to sue to persons
aggrieved by a violation of the act, the Illinois
legislature intended to include only persons having
suffered an injury from a violation as “aggrieved.”
Id. The court also noted that the interpretation of
“aggrieved” as meaning that a plaintiff must establish “an
injury” was consistent with Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition
of an “aggrieved party,” which is “[a] party entitled to a
remedy; esp., a party whose personal, pecuniary, or property
rights have been adversely affected by another person’s actions
or by a court’s decree or judgment.” Id. (citation omitted).
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The court’s analysis in McCollough is persuasive.
Significantly, other Illinois statutes do not contain similar
limiting language. For example, the “Customer Service and
Privacy Protection” of Illinois’ Cable and Video Customer
Protection Law provides that “[a]ny customer . . . may pursue
alleged violations of this Act by the cable or video provider in
a court of competent jurisdiction.” 220 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/22501 (emphasis added). The difference strongly suggests that the
inclusion of “aggrieved” in an Illinois statute limits a private
right of action to a party that can link an injury to a
statutory violation.
The plaintiffs oppose this interpretation and argue at
length that “aggrieved” means only that a plaintiff must come
within a statute’s zone-of-interest, but the cases that the
plaintiffs cite lead to the inference that, under Illinois law,
“aggrieved” means that a plaintiff must link a statutory harm to
an injury to have a cause of action.11 See, e.g., Am. Sur. Co. v.
Jones, 51 N.E.2d 122, 125-26 (Ill. 1943) (under Illinois law, a
statute that gives an “aggrieved” party a right to seek judicial
review of an administrative decision means that the party must
have “a direct, immediate and substantial interest rather than a
11

Because “aggrieved” requires a plaintiff to establish that the
plaintiff suffered harm attributable to a statutory violation,
and because the plaintiffs have failed to satisfy this
threshold, the plaintiffs cannot be said to fall within the
BIPA’s zone-of-interest.
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speculative, theoretical, inconsequential or remote interest” in
the matter); Glos v. People, 102 N.E. 763, 766 (Ill. 1913) (“A
person is prejudiced or aggrieved, in the legal sense, when a
legal right is invaded by the act complained of or his pecuniary
interest is directly affected by the decree or judgment. . . .
‘Aggrieved’ means having a substantial grievance; a denial of
some personal or property right.”).
The plaintiffs cite Mandziara v. Canulli, 701 N.E.2d 127
(Ill. App. 1998), which involved alleged violations of the
Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities
Confidentiality Act (the “MHA”). The MHA provides that, “No
party . . . nor his or her attorney, shall serve a subpoena
seeking to obtain access to records or communications under this
Act unless the subpoena is accompanied by a written order issued
by a judge, authorizing the disclosure of the records or the
issuance of the subpoena.” Id. at 131 (quoting 740 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 110/10(d)). The MHA also provides that, “Any person
aggrieved by a violation of this Act may sue for damages, an
injunction, or other appropriate relief.” Id. (quoting 740 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 110/15)). The court in Mandziara held that the
plaintiff there “ha[d] the right to sue a lawyer who obtained
and served a subpoena for [the plaintiff’s] records, which were
then brought to a courtroom and used by a judge” in violation of
the MHA. Id. at 129. In that case, the defendant-lawyer claimed
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that he had not reviewed the mental health records himself, and
thus that no harm to the plaintiff had occurred. See id. at 132.
The court found that the defendant-lawyer’s claim was
contradicted by the evidence, see id., but, regardless, observed
that, “The [Illinois] General Assembly has made a strong
statement about the importance of keeping mental health records
confidential. If we were to hold [the defendant-lawyer] did not
violate the [MHA] merely because he did not look at [the
plaintiff’s] records, we would be rewriting the statute,
effectively eroding unmistakable legislative intent under the
weight of judicial fiat.” Id. at 133.
The plaintiffs in this case seize on that language to argue
that “aggrieved” does not require a plaintiff to establish an
injury under Illinois law. The plaintiffs ignore that the court
in Mandziara found that the plaintiff there had suffered an
injury regardless of whether the defendant-lawyer had viewed the
mental health records because the trial court had reviewed the
mental health records in open court, and on the record, thus
“improperly disclos[ing]” the plaintiff’s confidential
information in violation of the MHA. See id. Mandziara’s
interpretation of the MHA is consistent with the interpretation
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of the BIPA that an “aggrieved” party must link a statutory
violation to an injury to have a cause of action.12
For the reasons already discussed, the plaintiffs have not
established an injury attributable to an alleged procedural
violation of the BIPA. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claims must
be dismissed.
V.
The plaintiffs have not asked for leave to amend the Second
Amended Complaint. In any event, further amendment would be
futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962);
Mackensworth v. S.S. Am. Merch., 28 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir.
1994); see also Graham v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 156
F. Supp. 3d 491, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Generally, the grant of
leave to amend the pleadings pursuant to Rule 15(a) is within
the discretion of the trial court.” (citation and quotation
marks omitted)). The plaintiffs have already amended their
complaint twice, and there is no suggestion that further
amendment would enable them to cure the deficiencies in the
Second Amended Complaint. See Leyse v. Bank of Am., Nat. Ass’n,
12

The plaintiffs cite Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 16 CH
13 (Lake County Ill., June 17, 2016) (attached as Exhibit B to
the plaintiffs’ opposition), which held that the plaintiff there
had a cause of action under the BIPA to pursue claims of
procedural violations regardless of whether those violations
caused an injury. The court in Rosenbach denied the defendantamusement park’s motion to dismiss in a single sentence, devoid
of any further reasoning. Id. Rosenbach is not persuasive. See
McCollough, 2016 WL 4077108, at *5 (discounting Rosenbach).
50

Case 1:15-cv-08211-JGK Document 74 Filed 01/30/17 Page 51 of 51

No. 09 CIV. 7654 (JGK), 2010 WL 2382400, at *6 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.
June 14, 2010) (citing L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, No.
09 CIV. 1432 (DC), 2010 WL 532160, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16,
2010)).
CONCLUSION
The Court has considered all of the arguments raised by the
parties. To the extent not specifically addressed, the arguments
are either moot or without merit. For the foregoing reasons,
Take-Two’s motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint is
granted and the Second Amended Complaint is dismissed with
prejudice.13 The Clerk is directed to enter judgment dismissing
this action and closing the case. The Clerk is also directed to
close all pending motions.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

New York, New York
January 27, 2017

____________/s/______________
John G. Koeltl
United States District Judge

13

The dismissal is with prejudice because the dismissal is
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for failure to state a claim as well as pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for want
of standing, and there is no basis to grant the plaintiffs leave
to replead. See, e.g., Feinberg v. Apple, Inc., No. 15-CV-5198
(RA), 2016 WL 4371746, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2016).
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